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Constitutional prohibition. 
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1. Statement of the Case. 
1.1 Nature of the Case/Introduction. 
The Independent Highway District (IHD) and the City of Sandpoint (City) agreed in 2003 
to settle a series of long festering legal battles over how best to meet the shared statutory 
obligation to properly maintain roads and streets within the City limits. The judicially approved 
settlement provides that the City has the burden to maintain IHD streets and roads within the 
City, with the understanding that all ad valorem taxes imposed by IHD on City residents would 
be available to the City to fund the obligation. The core documents memorializing the 
relationship are ( 1) II-ID' s written proposal to settle the litigation dated June 24, 2003 ("Offer") ; 
(2) a Stipulation for Settlement dated July 3, 2003 ("Stipulation"); (3) a Joint Powers Agreement 
dated July 8, 2003 ("JPA"); (4) a City Resolution dated August 17, 2005 confirming title to the 
streets lies with IHD, but by mutual agreement control of such is with the City ("Resolution"); 
and (5) a Memorandum of Understanding dated August 19, 2005 ("MOU"). 1 The unequivocal 
purpose of the core documents is: 
The purpose of this agreement is to divide the jurisdiction, maintenance and 
control of streets and public rights of way within the boundaries of the district 
between the District and the City and provide for the sharing of ad valorem tax 
revenue. 
JP A R. 3 7 ( emphasis added) 
1 While contained in the record, these documents are here attached as Exs. 1-5 for the court's convenience. 
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This action was brought for one reason. IHD's attorney wrote the City on July 11, 2013 
that he had opined the ten (10) year old settlement documents were unconstitutional, that the 
Court approved obligations were illegal and the sharing of revenue would cease "effective 
immediately". (RP 45) When the opining lawyer was advised there was actually a JPA 
memorializing the relationship, he then wrote on July 25, 2013 advising IHD Commissioners at 
that date had, " ... elected to terminate the Joint Powers Agreement effectively immediately". 
(RP 47) Facing the crisis of funding for City roads and a fast approaching winter driving season, 
the City filed an action for Declaratory Relief on August 16, 2013. The District Court granted 
summary judgment affirming the documents are legal and enforceable on July 31, 2013. IHD 
appeals with a scattershot of arguments which attack the core documents in either an artful 
manipulation of the record or relies on an incorrect reading of the controlling law. 
At the heart of this case are two facts IHD ignores. First, the core documents are an 
agreement to meet a shared statutory primary obligation to maintain streets in the City of 
Sandpoint. See, LC. §40-201. Second, to settle ongoing litigation, IHD demanded that the then 
pending IHD dissolution election be vacated. (Offer, i!4, RP p. 103)2 Ten years after the fact, 
IHD wanted the benefit of the settlement, i.e. that it not be dissolved by pending election, but to 
be shed of its burden to comply with the contract it executed to settle long standing, and serial, 
2 There would be no serious challenge that the 2003 County Commissioner approved election was designed to and 
would have resulted in dissolution ofIHD. 
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litigation. To refuse payment, IHD creates an illusion of unconstitutionality that will not stand 
the most cursory of reviews. 
1.2 Course of Proceedings. 
The City filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on August 16, 2013, 
seeking declaration of the legality of the JP A, and validity of the core documents (R. pp. 19-4 7) 
IHD moved to dismiss, which was denied on December 9, 2013. The effect of the ruling on the 
motion to dismiss all but established the validity of the JP A. (R. pp. 154-17 5) Because the City 
was faced with imminent winter road maintenance and plowing, it requested, and IHD agreed, to 
stipulate that IHD would perfo1m under the JP A and pay the ad valorum taxes owed while this 
matter remained pending. (R. pp. 176-178) Based on the stipulation, the District Court entered a 
preliminary injunction on December 18, 2013. (R. pp. 179-180)3 
IHD sought a permissive appeal which this Court declined on July 29, 2014. (R. p. 272) 
The City then moved for summary judgment seeking finality relying on the legal argument 
offered in opposition to IHD' s motion to dismiss, i.e. that the JP A was valid and enforceable as a 
matter of law. (R. pp. 190-193) The District Court granted the City's motion on July 31, 2014, 
which incorporated its findings from its order denying the motion to dismiss. (R. pp. 273-290) 
The City thereafter timely filed its memorandum of fees and costs on August 13, 2015. 
(R. pp. 330-334) The District Court entered an Amended Declaratory and Monetary Judgment 
on August 22, 2014, which included a declaration ordering IHD to comply with the JP A, and pay 
3 That payment obligation continues and IHD has complied with its commitment. 
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all ad valorem taxes owing, including any "collection for delinquent taxes, interests and costs"; it 
awarded attorney fees as the monetary judgment. (R. pp. 345-349) Because IHD had not yet 
filed its objection to fees and costs, the District Comi granted IHD's motion for reconsideration, 
considered IHD's timely objection, and then confirmed the attorneys fees previously awarded; 
that order was entered on October 24, 2014. (R. Supplemental Record, Memorandum Decision 
and Order Granting In Part (As To Timing Of This Court's Prior Decision) And Denying In Paii 
(As To Amount Of Attorney Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's Motion For 
Reconsideration Of Attorney Fees, p. 4 ("Memorandum Decision") 
While the parties went back and forth in the necessary language of the judgment to render 
it final for the purpose of I.R.C.P. 54, the District Court entered final judgment on November 24, 
2014, and denied IHD's motion to alter or amend the judgment on April 10, 2015. (R. pp. 385-
390) This appeal followed. 
1.3 Statement of Facts. 
This case has had a long judicial history that played out before the Supreme Court in 
three previous separate matters. This history is vital to establish the context and basis of the 
parties' JPA, yet was wholly ignored by IHD. The first matter was ruled on in 1994, City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994) 
(Sandpoint I). In that case, the City initially sued IHD trying to gain control over the 
maintenance of streets within the City, and that action addressed who had ultimate authority over 
the street maintenance and their day-to-day operations within the City limits. The Supreme 
13 
Court concluded that because the City did not have a functioning street depruiment, IHD retained 
general supervisory authority to maintain the streets. Sandpoint I at pp. 150-151. 
In response to the ruling in Sandpoint I, the City did organize a functioning street 
department by ordinance passed May 17, 2000. It then commenced a declaratory judgment 
asking whether it had executive general supervisory authority over the City's public streets, since 
the City formed a fully functioning street department in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003) (Sandpoint II). The District 
Court ruled in favor of the City, but certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court in Sandpoint II determined the relevant statutory clause was silent as to the mechanism of 
transfe1Ting responsibility between the Highway IHD and the City. The court reasoned that a 
multi-step process existed to divest a Highway IHD's liabilities, so it would be inconsistent with 
the legislative intent to permit a City to exclude its taxpayers from IHD liabilities by just fo1ming 
a street department. The Supreme Court thus found that statutory dissolution of IHD would be 
necessary before the City could obtain jurisdiction over the City streets within its boundaries. 
Sandpoint II, 139 Idaho at 70. The summary judgment issued by the District Court was reversed, 
and the matter was remanded for further proceedings on June 19, 2003. 
The third key decision lead directly to the JP A at issue here in Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County and Bonner County and 
City of Sandpoint, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003) (Sandpoint III). That action was brought 
by IHD to enjoin the County from conducting the very election to dissolve IHD that was called 
for in Sandpoint II. The City was an Intervenor in that case, as well as one of the petitioners to 
14 
dissolve IHD that had been filed in April 2000. The question on appeal was whether the County 
Commissioners properly detennined it was in the best interest for the entire IHD to be dissolved 
and scheduled an election for a vote on the dissolution. On June 4, 2003, the Supreme Court 
concurred that the Commissioners' findings were correct; dissolution would be in the best 
interest of the public. The Court sent the matter back, allowing an election. 
With the almost simultaneous remands of Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III confronting the 
parties, cooler heads prevailed; the City and IHD negotiated a compromise that resolved both 
companion cases. IHD proposed a settlement that included entry into a Joint Powers Agreement 
(R. pp. 103-104) The settlement was entered of record on July 3, 2003 as a Stipulation for 
Settlement. (R. pp. 32-36) During the three years while the appeals of Sandpoint II and 
Sandpoint III were pending, the parties had agreed to an arrangement that divided the labor; the 
City maintained the streets within its boundaries, while IHD maintained all other streets outside 
the City but within IHD boundaries. (R. p. 34) 
This arrangement was memorialized in the Stipulation for Settlement, which also 
provided that the City and IHD would enter into the JP A for future work and funding 
disbursements. (R. p. 35) IHD and the City represented on the record that they agreed to the 
following verities that cannot now be disputed by IHD: 
1. [T]hat the interests of the taxpayers within the respective entities and of the road 
users would best be served by continuation of the present arrangements. 
2. Based on experience, the City should maintain its own streets and IHD should 
expand its service area by annexation. 
3. That continued litigation and the anticipated dissolution election would be costly 
and would not be in the best interests of the public. 
15 
(R. pp. 34-35) The terms of the settlement called for a joint statement of road control, entry into 
the JP A, that the City would join to vacate the dissolution election, and the City would not object 
to future annexations into IHD. (R. pp. 35-36) 
The Comi approved Stipulation provides: 
2. The Sandpoint Independent Highway IHD and the City of Sandpoint shall 
enter into a joint powers agreement made pursuant to Chapter 23, Title 67, 
Idaho Code which will provide for division of all ad valorem funds received 
under Chapter 8, Title 40, Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreement is 
intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only by 
mutual agreement of both parties. The division of funds shall be made 
twice yearly. The joint powers agreement would provide that the 
Sandpoint Independent Highway IHD pay over to the City of Sandpoint 
all ad valorem property tax funds received from levies by IHD upon all 
property located within the city limits. The joint powers agreement 
would cover other matters as are appropriate. The tax revenues from IHD 
levies upon property within the city limits received in the current fiscal year 
shall be paid by IHD to the City commencing with the 2003 levy. (Emphasis 
added) 
(R. pp. 35-36) 
The Comi approved the Stipulation by Order dated July 11, 2003. (R. p. 99) 
Sandpoint III was dismissed with prejudice on June 4, 2004 (CV-00-788). The parties thereafter 
complied with the Stipulation and entered into the JP A. (R. pp. 3 7-41) As required by the 
Stipulation for Settlement, the JP A reflected a "permanent" resolution to the litigation, and thus, 
as noted by IHD, had no provision for "renegotiation"; it did provide that it could be terminated 
or amended on mutual agreement. (R. p. 37) No aspect of the JPA, core documents or actions of 
the parties since 2003 to meet the obligations to the citizens residing in Sandpoint are contra to 
the rulings in Sandpoint L II or III. 
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As a consideration for entering into the JP A, the City agreed to assist in withdrawing the 
petition to dissolve IHD and agreed not to challenge future annexations to IHD. (R. p. 36) The 
election did not occur. Future annexations have occurred over the past ten years and include 
such communities as Dover and Ponderay. 
On July 11, 2013, exactly ten (10) years after this Court approved the stipulation, IHD 
notified the City that it was unilaterally withholding funds and refused to perform its obligations 
under the JPA. (R. p. 45)4 On July 25, 2013, IHD notified the City that it unilaterally "elected" 
to terminate the JP A, and ceased apportioning the ad valorem tax revenues collected within the 
City limits. (R. p. 4 7) The City filed its Complaint in this action on August 16, 2013, 
(Sandpoint IV) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring IHD to comply with the terms 
of the JP A. (R. pp. 19-4 7) 
The tenns of the JP A and the relevant law are not in dispute, as IHD recognized when it 
moved to dismiss the action under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) based on five arguments, now fashioned in 
part on this appeal. IHD argued the JP A, ( 1) was an indebtedness prohibited by the Constitution; 
(2) violated LC. §40-801 which required an equal division of ad valorem taxes between the City 
and IHD, while the JP A promised the City all of the tax funds from levies within the City; (3) is 
unlawful under the Joint Powers Act because there is no tem1ination provision; (4) is an unlawful 
perpetual contract; and (5) lacked consideration. (R. pp. 158-159) The District Court reviewed 
all of these bases and denied the motion to dismiss on all grounds. 
17 
The City moved for and obtained summary judgment (R. p. 290) and obtained a final 
declaratory and monetary judgment that the JP A was indeed valid and enforceable; and that IHD 
was to comply with its terms, and pay the taxes, including any delinquent taxes and interest and 
costs, whether "past, present and future," plus a quantified attorney fees award. (R. pp. 385-387) 
Now on appeal, IHD abandons the majority of its asse1iions and focuses solely on the 
court's finding that the JP A complied with both Art. VIII of the Constitution and the Joint 
Powers Act. While IHD inaccurately restates the District Court's "six conclusions" to argue 
error, the undisputed facts establish the validity of the JP A and the propriety of the court's award 
of relief, including attorney fees. 
2. Additional Issues/Attorneys' Fees on Appeal. 
1. Whether the District Comi's entry of summary judgment, judgment and 
attorney's fees was proper? 
2. Whether the City of Sandpoint is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal based on 
LC.§ 12-117, 12-121, and I.A.R. 41(a)? 
3. Argument. 
There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of county 
highways in each county, a system of highways in each highway district, and a 
system of highways in each city, except as otherwise provided. The improvement 
of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the established and 
permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby imposed upon 
the state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, to improve 
4 Not significant to resolution of the case, but contrary to IHD's continual assertion that it repeatedly requested 
termination of the JPA, the record is clear that the IHD Commissioners "elected to terminate" the JPA only after the 
City's attorney contacted counsel for IHD after the cessation of payments. (R. p. 47) 
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and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction as hereinafter 
defined, within the limits of the funds available. 
LC. §40-201 (Emphasis added) 
This case involves a contract reached in settlement for the faithful performance of a joint 
statutory duty imposed upon both the City and IHD to improve and maintain roads. Any IHD 
inference that its mandate or duty has been impaired by entering into a statutorily approved 
agreement to more effectively deliver highway services to the citizens of Bonner County is 
misplaced. IHD knows its boundaries and overall supervisory role over streets cannot be lost 
except upon dissolution, as this Court ruled in Sandpoint I and IL To avoid dissolution, IHD 
determined it was willing to permit the day-to-day road and highway responsibilities could vest 
with the City, and the means to provide the necessary funds was agreed upon. There is nothing 
untoward or conceptually impure in the agreement embodied in the core documents between the 
City and IHD. 
On appeal, IHD offers a parsed scattershot reading of the core documents that apparently 
argues the core agreements were unconstitutional and thus void, resulted in an invalid loss of 
IHD "jurisdiction," are invalid under the Joint Powers Act, and should not have included a 
declaration that interest and penalties were to be remitted under the JP A. All of these 
conclusions are incorrect. The core documents are to be interpreted based first and foremost on 
the language used in the four comers of the documents, they are to be read together, and the 
court is to construe them as a matter oflaw when not ambiguous. See, State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 
139, 141,294 P.3d 1151 (Ct. App. 2013); Charpentier v. Welch, 74 Idaho 242, 246-47, 259 P.2d 
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814 (1953). Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549, 286 P.3d 185 
(Idaho 2012) (an unambiguous contract must be construed as a matter of law). The court also 
construes constitutional and statutory provisions as a matter of law. See, Idaho Department of 
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468,470,283 P.3d 785 (2012); Thus, this court will 
reach the same conclusion on review as did the court below: The JPA did not violate the 
Constitution, the JP A was not illegal or void, and no issues of fact existed to preclude summary 
judgment on the declaratory relief requested. 
Moreover, IHD argues that the form of injunction was improper, and attorney fees 
improperly granted, both rulings of which are only reviewed for a manifest abuse of discretion, 
on which the appellant bears the burden of proof. Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 
572,944 P.2d 704 (1997); Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547,549, 181 P.3d 473 (2008). 
3.1 The Joint Powers Agreement is constitutional, and the parties are entitled to 
provide for apportionment of taxes pursuant to that JP A. 
The unsupported claim that the JP A is unconstitutional under Art. VIII §3 ignores the 
circumstances under which it was executed, the consideration given for it, and the ultimate court 
approval at inception. The JP A is a contract executed as paii of a stipulated settlement to end 
litigation between the parties after 20 years of conflict over the maintenance of streets within the 
City of Sandpoint. (See, Sandpoint I, Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III) If the JP A "is unique" in 
Idaho between a municipality and IHD, it is not because it is an unenforceable debt or liability, 
but because it is a settlement reached as a result of decades of litigation. Settling litigation of 
necessity requires finality, and an agreement the parties must stand by and be bound to in order 
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to permanently resolve the disputes; settlement of litigation is an "obviously" favored public 
policy. Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enterprises, Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 949 
(1978) (agreements accomplishing this result will be disregarded "only for the strongest of 
reasons"). Simply because IHD is bound to continue to perform under the Settlement Agreement 
into the future does not render such settlement unconstitutional. 
In fact, Idaho courts have routinely recognized governmental agencies' abilities to settle 
lawsuits, even in those circumstances which require states to perform monetary obligations long 
into the future. See~' Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753 (9111 Cir. 1990) (state compromised 
class action requiring mental health service be provided to class of juveniles; settlement 
agreement reached in 1983 enforced as to all persons entitled to services in perpetuity). Such 
settlements do not create unconstitutional "debts or liabilities," although under IHD's reasoning, 
virtually any future commitment would be so defined. 
In ignoring the context of settlement, IHD inaccurately states the purpose and terms of 
the JP A. It then basically misstates the court's ruling on summary judgment, asse1iing it was 
based on six conclusions, each which require reversal. See, IHD's Brie±: p. 6. However, as is 
noted in the following response, IHD has inaccurately portrays the court's decision and relevant 
law concerning the JP A. 
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a. The Joint Powers Agreement did not create a "multi-year" 
"indebtedness or liability" subject to Constitutional prohibition. 
This case does not involve a debt or liability prohibited by Art. VIII §3 of the Idaho 
Constitution. This case is about how IHD has agreed to "divide" the funds it statutorily has 
available annually to meet its statutory duty to maintain the streets within its boundaries. 
While IHD emphasizes the District Court's statement that the JP A indeed created a 
"liability," because that term is more loosely defined, Art. VIII §3 prohibits "indebtedness, or 
liability ... exceeding in that year the income and revenue provided for it in such year." The 
undisputed facts establish that the JP A did not create a debt or liability which exceeded the levy 
which IHD makes in each year, and the constitutional provision does not apply, even were the 
court to term the JP A a "liability." There is no need to separate the analysis of debt/liability from 
the concept of exceeding revenue for a given year, because only those debts and liabilities that 
exceed a year's revenue fall within the constitutional prohibition. It is undisputed the JP A 
created no debt or liability which exceeded the yearly revenues of IHD's levy. No more or less 
has to be allocated to the City than that actually collected from City residents. 
IHD has the power to levy a tax. LC. §40-801(a). If that levy is made upon property 
within the limits of any incorporated city, 50% of the funds are automatically apportioned to that 
incorporated city. IHD has no control over those funds. Id. By agreement, IHD has limited its 
exposure to the City roads to the balance of the revenue collected. The levy is a burden on all 
the taxpayers residing in IHD. The levy amount can freely change as circumstances change. 
The amount can be up, or it can go down. (Aff. of S. Syth, i-f6, R. p. 107) This case is not about 
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a fixed amount IHD must pay annually in perpetuity. This case is about dividing an annual pot 
of money and who is going to write the check from that pot of money to fix the roads in 
Sandpoint, Idaho. The parties agreed in the 2003 how the revenue would be allocated to 
maintain the streets of Sandpoint. The amount allocated to the City is not contingent upon 
receiving appropriations from the legislative process as contemplated by the Idaho Constitution 
when referencing indebtedness.5 The amount paid can never exceed the amount collected. 
Thus, the purpose of the constitutional provision is simply not implicated by the JP A. 
Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits municipal governments, including cities and 
other subdivisions of the state, from incurring indebtedness or liability exceeding that year's 
revenues without a two-thirds approval by the voters. The purpose of the section is "to prevent 
local government entities from incurring debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan 
to retire those debts." City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 388 (2006); Taxpayers 
for Improving Pub. Safety v. Schwarzenegger, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 377 (2009). Idaho's 
limitation on indebtedness was modeled after California's constitution. Frazier, 143 Idaho at 3. 
California courts have declared that the provision is intended "to prohibit the accumulation of 
public debt without the consent of the taxpayers, and require governmental agencies to carry on 
their operations on a cash basis." In re S. Humboldt Cmty. Healthcare Dist., 254 B.R. 758, 760 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000). 
5 If IHD contends that the JPA creates an ongoing indebtedness by virtue of regular division of its revenue given to 
the City, it must similarly contend that LC. §40-80 I, which requires a 50% remittance to the City, is an 
unconstitutional "debt". IHD has not, and indeed cannot, demonstrate the unconstitutionality of LC. §40-801 while 
using the statute to buttress its argument against the validity of the JPA. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court declared long ago that a municipality does not violate the 
constitutional prohibition on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of the revenue for that year. 
Ball v. Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454 (1897). Here, IHD's disbursement to the City 
pursuant to the JP A are limited to a portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement will ever 
require funds beyond what IHD has already collected. This is in accord with the concept that 
'"[a] sum payable upon a contingency is not a debt, nor does it become a debt until the 
contingency happens."' In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4th 
758, 807, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 312 (U.S. 2012) (quoting Doland v. Clark, 143 Cal. 176, 181, 
76 P. 958 (1904)). In In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, the court determined 
that "the state's commitment in the Joint Powers Agreement to pay the excess mitigation costs 
does not violate Section 1, Article XVI of the California Constitution because the state's 
commitment is contingent on there being excess mitigation costs, and a contingent obligation 
does not qualify as a 'debt' or 'liability' within the meaning of'' California's constitutional limit 
on debt. 20 I Cal.App. 4th at 807. (Emphasis added) 
Similarly, this case deals only with periodic disbursements from IHD to fulfill its 
statutory duty to maintain City roads, as the funds are received. Construction and maintenance 
of roads by statute is the only reason IHD has the power to levy taxes. By its terms, the JP A 
simply requires IHD to "forward to the City all tax revenues received by IHD collected from 
properties within the [c]ity ... " (R. p. 39) Conversely, a debt is "an 'unconditional promise to 
pay a fixed sum at some specified time, and is quite different from a contract to be performed in 
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the future, depending upon a condition precedent, which may never be performed, and which 
cannot ripen into a debt until perfonned." 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41: 17 (3d ed.). 
Merely incurring a future allocation of funds as collected does not create an indebtedness. 
A contract to pay a fixed price annually, where contingent on the supply furnished, does not 
create an indebtedness. 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41:22 (2013). For example, "If an obligation 
is payable out of a special fund only, and the municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally 
held that there is no indebtedness." 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41 :30 (3d ed.) ( citing U.S. v. 
City of Charleston, 149 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.W.Va. 1957); Law Offices of Cary L. Lapidus v. City 
of Wasco, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (2004). Specifically, moneys to be paid out of the existence of a 
future potential contingent fund, and not from general city funds, are not considered debt or a 
future liability, and not prohibited by the Constitution. McQuillin, id. at 1368. See also, 
Homebuilders Assoc. v. Kansas City, 431 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1968) (contract for reimbursement 
from revenues derived from water main extension were not unconstitutional "debts"). 
In this case, IHD's disbursement to the City is akin to a potential contingent fund, as IHD 
is not otherwise liable to pay City any fixed amount at any point; IHD's disbursement amount is 
entirely conditioned by its collection of taxes on properties within the city. Truly, ifIHD elected 
to have no levy for a tax year, there would be no obligation to pay. It is impossible to convert an 
agreed allocation of the use of funds, when and if collected as an obligation to pay a sum ce1iain. 
(As shown by the Affidavit of Ms. Syth, in fact the amount varies each year. (R. pp. 107-108)) 
As in Lapidus, IHD's promise to disburse tax revenues to the City does not "place a charge upon 
the general funds of the City, nor create a situation in which future taxpayers might be strapped 
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with obligations incurred by a prior administration without the ability to meet those obligations 
or the necessary voter approval." Id. (citations omitted). Taxes levied on property within a city 
are generally not part of its indebtedness. 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41: 17. The JP A is simply 
what the stipulation states it is; an agreement on the division of revenue. That is not a debt or 
liability of a sum certain. 
Apparently recognizing that there has been no "debt" created beyond the revenue years, 
IHD now asserts that the inclusion of the term "liability" in Art. VIII §3 means that any 
"obligation" to pay the funds, if levied and collected in the future, violates the Constitution. 
However, neither the cases cited by IHD nor the undisputed facts here establish such a result. 
IHD's analysis staiis with the false premise that the JP A creates a legal duty by IHD to 
levy taxes, which it then must pay over to the City as a future creditor who can "demand 
payment." IHD asserts that the "obligation" to pay over future years' revenue thus becomes a 
"liability" prohibited by the Constitution. In reality, the JPA does not require IHD to levy one 
cent in tax; because the JPA does not obligate IHD to levy, it creates no rights by the City to 
demand or enforce a tax levy. Rather, to meet its mandate to create and maintain a system of 
roads and highways, IHD has the authority and obligation to impose a levy. LC. §40-201 The 
JP A only establishes a division of IHD's tax revenues once received. The District Court properly 
analyzed the JP A as creating no "liability" which exceeds the years' revenues. 
While IHD claims no authority supports the analysis that IHD will never pay over more 
than it collects to preclude application of A1i. VIII §3, in fact, the City, as outlined above, 
provided the court with persuasive authority from a variety of sources that properly analyzes 
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exactly this type of JP A. The "liability" does not bind IHD to pay funds greater than its capacity 
to pay in the first year; IHD is "liable" only if it assess taxes, and the JP A creates no obligation to 
pay into the future without the funds in that year to pay. Contrary to IHD's assertion, IHD's 
former Board did not obligate "itself to perpetually levy real property taxes and pay the revenues 
from such levy to the City." (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 19) Nothing in the JPA obligates IHD to 
so levy, and thus does not create a liability which may or may not be payable by future revenue. 
This is the fact that renders all of the cases cited by IHD inapplicable and irrelevant to the issues 
at hand. IHD details several Idaho cases at length, but they are limited to their facts, and none 
establish that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the Idaho constitutional prohibition on 
"multi-year debt." In Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931), quoted at 
length by IHD, the City of Emmett entered into a contract for a "rent to own" sprinkler system 
arrangement in which it committed to pay a fixed sum per year. While the City argued the 
sums to be paid were from special assessments of local improvement districts, the court noted 
such district had not yet been formed, and moreover, the City could not "pledge the revenues" 
from this future source because the City was contracting for the payments and created 
indebtedness into the future. 
Thus, contrary to IHD's argument, the reasoning in Williams does not apply. The City in 
Williams contracted to pay a fixed sum, year after year, irrespective of where it intended to 
gamer the funds from; had no district been formed, and no revenues generated, and the City 
would have owed its fixed sum for the purchase of the goods and services from some later 
income source; any default would subject them to liability for the sums they contracted to pay at 
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the outset of the contract. The "pledge" of future revenues was not a term of the contract that 
created potential future liability. The debt was fixed at the outset. 
The same is true of the remaining authority on which IHD heavily relies, such as Charles 
Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912), Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 
668, 284 P. 843 (1930), City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006), and City of 
Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 237 P.3d 1200 (2010). All involved contracts for the 
purchase of goods and services in which the municipality contracted to pay over multiple years. 
The District Court properly found such case law inapplicable because unlike any of these 
instances, the contract (the JP A) was instead for a division of revenues, whatever they may be, 
levied and collected by IHD; they were not fixed sum purchases which created a debt or liability 
that was owing, irrespective of what the sources of revenue may be. In those instances, the 
money is owing and is a current liability no matter what future source of revenue is identified to 
pay the owed amounts. 
This significant difference is actually confirmed in a recent ruling, also heavily relied on 
by IHD. In Greater Boise Auditorium District ("GBAD") v. Frazier, 2015 WL 6080521 (Idaho 
2015), the GBAD entered into an agreement for the construction and sale of a new facility. It 
simultaneously entered into an assignment and lease with a third party financier who would take 
the debt and lease the facility on one-year terms, renewable for 24 years, to the GBAD; if the 
GBAD did not have the funds to pay the lease amount in any one year, it could elect not to 
renew. The court properly found that the agreement, no matter what it was termed, did not run 
afoul of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Art. VIII §3 because the lease "does not incur 
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long-term liability," finding the "framers of the Constitution were more concerned with 
contingent liabilities than potential liabilities." 
The GBAD comi did confinn that an entity could incur an unconstitutional "liability," but 
not "indebtedness," if such liability still obligated future payments of fixed sums, using the 
following example: 
If A by a valid contract employs B to work for him for the term of one year at $50 
per month, payable at the end of each and every month, would this contract not be 
a liability on A as soon as executed? A debt of $50 would accrue thereon at the 
end of each month, but the liability would be incurred at the time the contract was 
entered into. 
Id. at *6. 
The GBAD court went on to find that the lease arrangement was different than those 
circumstances in which a governmental subdivision is liable for the aggregate payments over the 
total term of the contract; in those instances, there is "nothing guaranteeing [the govermnental 
subdivision] could continue to make the payments to which it is obligated in future years." Id. 
Instead, the lease at issue in GBAD: 
... does not bind the District to any specifiable liability beyond the District's 
ability to pay in the year in which it was entered. It binds the District to pay rent 
of one year, something it currently has the funds to do. After the fiscal year's end, 
if the District has the funds to again pay for one year's rent, then it may renew the 
lease; if it does not, it does not have to pay anything by the terms of the lease. 
Id. at *7. 
This is exactly the reasoning the District Court here utilized and which appropriately 
interprets the constitutional provision against multi-year liabilities. The JPA does not require the 
payment of an aggregate sum by IHD over the total term of the contract, nor is IHD ever at risk 
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of paying an amount it does not have. The GBAD court distinguishes those types of "contingent 
liabilities" which the framers were concerned with, from "potential liabilities" which every 
governmental entity must have the authority to execute to make "governmental progress." Id. at 
*9. The underlying policy of Art. VIII §3 which the GBAD court confirmed is to insure that a 
governmental entity does not get "in over their heads financially," which also recognizes that it 
makes no sense to disapprove of every "potential liability," which would hamstring a 
governmental entity unnecessarily. Id. at *9. The JPA here can never expose IHD to financial 
hardship because any obligation to pay is potential and based on the collection of revenues, 
which it then apportions to the City. There simply is no multi-year liability which would 
mortgage their future or bankrupt IHD, and the Constitutional prohibition to long term debt or 
liability does not preclude the tax apportionment agreement here. 
b. The District Court did not rule that agreements between political 
subdivisions were exempt from the Constitutional prohibition for 
multi-year exemptions, nor does the City make that distinction. 
IHD asserts that the District Court ruled Art. VIII §3 does not apply to an agreement 
between two government agencies. That is not correct. IHD cites several lines from the District 
Court's opinion in which it distinguished the cases cited by IHD, which the District Court noted 
were "all cases involving the municipal purchases of systems or goods" from "private parties." 
(R. p. 161) However, the trial did not elaborate or rely on the concept of a "private party" 
purchase, to rule on the constitutional provision; it merely pointed out some of the facts of the 
cases. Rather, he relied on the fact that these cases involved the purchase of systems and goods 
for fixed sums for which the governmental entities would be liable over the aggregate term of the 
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contract. Neither the District Comi nor the City made any argument or distinction that Art. VIII 
§3 does not apply because IHD and the City are both political subdivisions. This portion of 
IHD's brief is perplexing. 
c. The District Court did not find that tax revenues were not general 
revenues, nor does the City rely on such a distinction. 
Similarly, IHD asserts that the District Court "reasoned" that Art. VIII §3 does not apply 
to IHD prope1iy tax revenues because they are not "general revenues." (See, Appellant's Brief, 
p. 25) Again, while one line of the District Comi's opinion restates the context of case law cited, 
it did not "reason" that taxes were not revenues. (See, R. p. 159-163) The District Court does 
not distinguish between general revenues or IHD prope1iy tax revenues, nor did it base a decision 
on that analysis. Neither the District Comi nor the City claim that the fact that the funds at issue 
are property taxes impact the reasoning or application of Art. VIII §3 of the Constitution. 
d. The District Court did not improperly define indebtedness as limited 
to goods or services, but simply found the reasoning in those cases 
limited to their facts. 
Again, the District Court did not reason that Art. VIII §3 applies only to an indebtedness 
or liability for the purchase of a system or goods. As noted above, however, when a 
governmental entity contracts for the purchase of a system or goods, and agrees to pay the 
aggregate purchase price of the service or good over the tenn of the contract into future years, it 
indeed runs afoul of Art. VIII §3. Neither the District Court nor the City takes the position that 
there could not be other instances in which a political subdivision incurs a debt or liability which 
violates the constitutional prohibition. As outlined above, and as confirmed in GBAD, an 
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unconstitutional "debt" or "liability" does not include the potential apportionment of funds levied 
by IHD to the City for road maintenance; this is a potential liability which does not expose IHD 
to any debt or liability for funds it does not have in a given year. Thus, it is not only contracts 
for the purchase of systems or goods that triggers Art. VIII §3, but rather the requirement of a 
fixed sum of money owed in the future, which an entity may or may not have, which renders 
such agreements unconstitutional. And those are not the facts of this case. 
e. The District Court did not rule the "special fund" doctrine applied to 
the JP A to protect it from unconstitutionality, nor did the City assert 
any such position. 
Again, IHD takes a single line from the District Court's opinion and asserts that the 
District Court "concluded that the special fund doctrine applies to the facts of this case," and is 
thus in error because Idaho has rejected the special fund doctrine, except in very specific 
circumstances identified in constitutional amendments. Neither the District Court nor the City 
asserts this position nor is it part of the reasoning behind the JPA's constitutionality. Once again, 
the District Court simply notes two of the cases cited by IHD, Feil and Miller, were cases where 
expenses were invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception. (R. p. 162) The 
District Comi did not mention the special fund exception again, did not assert that it applied to 
the facts of the JP A, did not adopt the reasoning of the special fund doctrine, and did not base 
any of its rnling on the special fund doctrine. Similarly, the City did not mention nor base its 
argument on the special fund doctrine. The District Court simply noted that the special fund 
doctrine later became an exception that was amended into Art. VIII §3, which was noted by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho in Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P .2d 839 (1983). It is 
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once again perplexing how IHD asserts that "the District Court's reliance on Asson was 
misplaced." (Appellant's Brie±: p. 30) The special fund doctrine and its constitutional treatment 
are not at issue in this case. 
f. The City has not, nor is it now asserting the "ordinary and necessary" 
exception under Art. VIII §3 of the Constitution. 
The City has established that Art. VIII §3 of the Constitution does not prohibit the JP A. 
It has never asserted, nor does it now assert, that Art. VIII §3 does not apply because the JP A 
addresses "ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state." 
g. IHD misconstrues the public policy of Art. VIII §3 of the Constitution, 
and misstates the City's desire to maintain its streets. 
IHD seems to assert that Art. VIII §3 is violated when a governmental entity loses its 
authority to determine how future revenues are spent, and that future IHD Boards have lost the 
ability to prioritize property tax revenues uses, and this loss of the ability to set policy should in 
some fashion render the JP A unconstitutional. First, Art. VIII §3 has as its base concern a 
governmental entity that obligates itself financially far into the future, which then subjects it to a 
liability which it cannot pay. See, GBAD, supra. IHD cites no authority for the concept that a 
provision is unconstitutional because IHD loses authority to set policy on how the City of 
Sandpoint streets will be maintained. All of the cases instead recognize that the future 
indebtedness prohibition in Idaho's Constitution is to ensure that an entity does not become 
financially distressed by obligating long term future income. 
Next, while the JP A does affect the ability of future IHD Boards to decide how its tax 
revenues should be spent to maintain the streets of the City, this argument made in isolation fails 
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to recognize that the JP A was entered into as a result of a stipulated settlement to end decades of 
litigation in which the City indeed sought to supervise the policy of its own street maintenance. 
IHD would be in the same boat if the City had succeeded in pursuing an election that dissolved 
it. If, as a matter of policy, a Board could never be bound by the terms of a settlement, 
governmental entities could never settle a case. Not only is the concept illogical, it is contrary to 
the law encouraging settlement. See, Lomas, supra. 
Contrary to IHD's assertion, none of these policies are "contrary to the intent of the 
framers of the Idaho Constitution." The City also has tax payers as well as an elected body to be 
protected, which the JP A endeavored to do; the recitation within the Stipulated Settlement 
confirmed that the "best interests" of the taxpayers and road users would be to continue the 
arrangement in which the City maintained its streets. The loss of policy setting by IHD within 
the City does not implicate Idaho's Constitution. 
3.2 The JP A complies with the Joint Power Act and remains enforceable. 
a. The JP A provides for an appropriate method of termination- that is, 
by the Parties' mutual asset. 
Idaho's Joint Powers Act ("Act") authorizes the type of JP A entered into between the City 
and IHD. LC. §67-2326, et seq. The Act authorizes municipal agencies to share responsibilities 
by joint agreement. The purpose of the Act is "to make the most efficient use of [public 
agencies'] powers by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage." LC. §67-2326. The 
Act pe1mits an agreement between any agency of the state having the same powers, privileges or 
authority. LC. 67-2328. The JPA is to implement the "permanent policy" concerning roads of 
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the State; a duty imposed on both the City and IHD. There can be no dispute that an agreement 
to share responsibilities for roads and highways fits squarely within the stated and policy reasons 
for the Act. 
IHD' s contention that the JP A is void for want of an effective termination clause is 
misguided. The District Court rejected this argument when it denied IHD's Motion to Dismiss 
(RP p. 169-171) LC. §67-2328 requires, "Any such agreement shall specify the following: 
(1) Its duration." The plain meaning of the statute does not require duration of a specific number 
of months or years, nor does it use the word "perpetuity". The JPA satisfies the Act's duration 
requirement by providing express te1ms of the JP A's duration as well as the provision for its 
tem1ination upon certain dissolving actions. The Parties did not leave any room for ambiguity 
when they mutually agreed on the JP A te1m to meet the mutual obligation to maintain City 
streets: 
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or until such 
time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to amend or terminate 
the same. 
(Complaint, Ex. B, R. p. 37) The JPA further provides: 
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatically terminate if the District is 
dissolved. It will also tem1inate if the City supports any future petition for 
dissolution of District. 
(Complaint, Ex. B, R. p. 41) 
The parties specifically provided for the JP A's _duration - in perpetuity until mutual 
amendment or termination. In fact, Courts have held that a definite term of duration in 
perpetuity is not the same as an "indefinite" duration. Bell v. Leven, 90 P.3d 1286 (Nev. 2004); 
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Southern Wine and Spirits of Nevada v. Mountain Valley Spring Company, LLC, 646 F.3d 526, 
532 (8th Cir. 2011 ). In both Bell and Southern Wine, the courts held that the parties 
contemplated the duration of their relationship - in perpetuity - and that those definite tem1s 
should be enforced according to their terms. 
IHD argues that because LC. §67-2328(5) requires a method(s) to be employed "in 
accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement" this language should be 
read by the Court to mean a joint powers agreement cannot continue in perpetuity. The statute 
does not say that. IHD also says there is no method of termination. Again, IHD is wrong: the 
method is mutual agreement or dissolution. 
Other states have found that a contract that "provide[ s] for termination or cancellation 
upon the occurrence of a specified event" is not void as a perpetual contract or terminable at will. 
Payroll Express Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285,291 (2d Cir.1981) (applying New 
York law); see, Nicholas Labs. Ltd. v. Almay, Inc., 900 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir.1990) (applying New 
York law); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1012 
(7th Cir.1985) (applying Illinois law); Southern Hous. Partnerships. Inc. v. Stowers Management 
Co., 494 So.2d 44, 47-48 (Ala.1986); G.M. Abodeely Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Co., 
669 N.E.2d 787, 789-90 (Mass. 1996). The specific event which allows termination can include 
a breach by a party of a term of the contract. See, First Commodity Traders, 766 F.2d at 1012; 
Payroll Express, 659 F.2d at 292; Ross-Simons of Warwick. Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 
386, 395 (D.R.I. 1998). 
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Factually, the parties have already relied upon the custom of using mutual agreement to 
amend the JP A, despite IHD's asse1iion that "the City has every incentive to decline" any 
renegotiation. (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 36) For example, see the mutual agreement of 2005 
between IHD and the City which resolved questions related to the vacating of streets. (R. pp. 43-
44) Contrary to that process, in this instance, IHD sent a single letter unilaterally breaching the 
JP A. (R. p. 45) The City was forced to sue to insure road maintenance. Thus, the duration until 
"mutual" decision has not been established as ineffective in any manner, and the JPA's duration 
clause should be found sufficient or limited to termination by mutual agreement and/or 
dissolution. 
b. The City and IHD properly exercised their authority under the Joint 
Powers Act which did not vest ownership with the City and thus did 
not inappropriately deprive IHD of "jurisdiction." 
Idaho's legislature has provided a statutory scheme that allows the state and public 
agencies "to make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate to their 
mutual advantage .... " LC. §67-2326. "Public agency" includes both cities and highway 
districts. LC. §67-2327. Public agencies may enter into agreements with one another for joint or 
cooperative action (a Joint Powers Agreement) for the "joint use, ownership and for operation 
agreements." The agreement may be for any power, privilege, or authority "enjoyed jointly." 
LC. §67-2328. IHD enjoyed its power over the City streets pursuant to I.C. §40-801. The City 
enjoys its power of its streets pursuant to I.C. §40-201. 
IHD asserts that the JP A "transferred jurisdiction" over the City streets improperly and in 
violation of the Joint Powers Act, because it had as its stated purpose a division of "jurisdiction" 
37 
over streets and public rights of way within the boundaries of IHD, and that the JPA by statute 
could only allow IHD and the City of Sandpoint to "jointly exercise their powers to maintain the 
streets within the City of Sandpoint," failed to "provide for joint exercise of power" and is thus 
contrary to the statute. 
IHD's argument seems to be the result of semantics; the JP A and the Joint Powers Act, as 
reflected in the Stipulated Settlement in the JP A simply allows the City to exercise "exclusive 
general supervisory authority over all streets and public rights of way within City limits." 
(R. p. 3 7) The use of the word "jurisdiction" by the language of the core documents and the 
actions of the paiiies have never been construed to have transferred ownership of the roads and 
highways in the City. The core documents do not terminate IHD's ownership. In fact the JPA 
spells out the scope of the Supervisory powers of the City, which by definition is a limitation. (R 
p. 38) In addition, the 2005 agreement confinns the paiiies' acknowledgement of IHD 
ownership. (R p. 43) The Joint Powers Agreement which provided that supervisory authority, 
and the disbursement of apportionment of taxes to the City, did not absolve IHD of its 
obligations to City streets; IHD's legal obligation is to maintain all of the roads within its 
jurisdiction, including the City roads. See, Sandpoint I, supra. 
However, the core documents are in fact replete with a repetition of the mutual 
acknowledgement that the boundaries of IHD have not been altered, the title to the streets and 
rights-of-way are the Districts and the intentions of the parties was to do the work of the people 
concerning roads in an orderly and agreeable fashion. And while it is true the word 
"jurisdiction" is used in vai·ious portions of the text, it is always in the context of who will 
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exercise supervisory authority over streets and has nothing to do with ownership of the streets 
which has always remained vested with IHD. The parties have lawfully entered into a contract 
and it is entitled to enforcement. IHD has failed to establish any basis to assert the contract is 
illegal. 
As argued by IHD, Sandpoint I and Sandpoint III affirmed that IHD has ultimate 
ownership responsibility. Nothing in the Joint Powers Act prohibits the parties from dividing tax 
funds and exercising supervisory authority, as outlined in the JPA. (R. pp. 37-38) While the 
heading of the recital in the JPA is "Jurisdiction, Maintenance and Control," the language of the 
JPA actually provides: 
The City shall exercise exclusive general supervisory authority over all streets and 
public rights of way within the city limits of the City of Sandpoint including any 
property subsequently annexed. 
(R. p. 37) 
The JP A then goes on to list the limitations on the supervisory authority to fourteen (14) discreet 
areas that got to routine maintenance and control activates. (RP p. 38) IHD's "jurisdiction" 
argument is simply not suppo11ed by the record and is fashioned solely to assert an unsupportable 
legal and factual proposition. 
In fact, in its Motion to Dismiss, IHD recognized that a JP A authorized local government 
agencies to cooperate and share responsibilities, because it may be inefficient for each agency to 
maintain the road, and thus "it may be a wise use of taxpayer funds for the two agencies to agree 
that one agency will perfonn all maintenance" on one po11ion of road. (R. pp. 66-67) While the 
JP A can allow the parties to agree that one agency will have the supervisory requirement to 
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perform maintenance, this does not mean that IHD delegated away or exceeded its statutory or 
constitutional authority by entering into this joint agreement. The JP A does not terminate IHD's 
ownership jurisdiction and the intentions of the parties is evident from the four corners of the 
core documents and the actions of the parties. 
As an example of the semantic arguments made about jurisdiction, IHD offers that since 
the JPA includes vacation of streets in the Supervisory authority, IHD has divested itself of 
ownership (in IHD verbiage - "jurisdiction") over the streets. (App. Brief, p. 39) Again, the 
core documents are ignored. First, the undertaking by the City appears under the heading of 
"Supervisory Authority" which includes, "l. Acquisitions, vacations and abandonment." 
(R p. 38) Second, there never was an intention to abandon ownership of the streets absent 
consent of IHD. This is established by the reference to the August 17, 2005 Resolution by the 
City specifically covering the issue of vacation of streets. (RP p. 42) The City acknowledged 
IHD owned the streets and it had become necessary to " ... simplify and clarify the process of 
vacating streets and right-of way with the City limits ... ". The agreed procedure adopted by the 
MOU signed the next day was that prior to any public hearing on the vacation of streets, the City 
would provide IHD thirty (30) day notice to object. Third, the MOU provides, "The IHD shall 
also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing title to the vacated way." (R p. 43) Not 
only is IHD review and opportunity required, IHD must also participate in the documentation of 
the act. There is no argument that can be fashioned to suggest under the core documents, the 
intentions of the parties and the actions taken that IHD has smTendered either its ownership or its 
right to approve any street vacation. 
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Moreover, nothing in the Joint Powers Act, LC. §67-2328(a) required the JPA to vest 
joint decision making or joint exercise of power over every decision related to the maintenance 
of City roads. IHD cites no case law for the proposition that proposition. The joint exercise of 
power authorized by the JP A, as indicated by IHD in its original brief in support of the motion to 
dismiss, indeed allows two agencies to agree that one agency will perform all the maintenance. 
It makes little sense to assert that IHD reserved the right to micromanage, or jointly decide what 
that maintenance will be in order to render the JP A in accordance with the statute. The JP A does 
no more than agree that the City will perform all maintenance on its own roads, which is exactly 
the purpose of a joint powers agreement. 
3.3 The District Court properly awarded declaratory relief to include the 
necessary performance of the JP A by payment of the delinquent taxes, as 
well as interest and penalties. 
a. The District Court properly ruled that "all property tax funds" 
included penalty and interest as a matter of law. 
IHD's lengthy discussion of the alleged district court's error "in declaring the City's rights 
under the JPA" (see, Appellant's Brief: pp. 41-49), is actually a simple proposition: Whether 
IHD's obligation to pay over "all prope1iy tax funds" and "all tax revenues" includes penalties 
and interest as a matter of law. The undisputed facts are not all of the City residents paid their 
taxes on time. When they did, IHD directed remittance of the late paid taxes, but not the accrued 
penalties or interest. The District Court properly found those phrases unambiguously included 
all funds collected by IHD in relation to its levy, and its grant of judgment to include these 
amounts are proper. 
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The Joint Powers Agreement between the City of Sandpoint and Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District provided that IHD would levy and apply for ad valorem property taxes under 
the authority granted in Idaho Code Title 40. (Complaint, Ex. "B," R. p. 39) Specifically, the 
parties agreed "the District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from such District 
levies on all property located within the City limits." (Complaint, Ex. "B", R. p. 39 emphasis 
added) The ad valorem property tax authority under Title 40 requires that the County pay over 
to the Highway District "all District tax monies collected by him and payable to the District as 
soon as they are collected ... " and pay over "all monies then due to the District, including all the 
District's proportion amount of delinquent District taxes, interest and costs on all tax sales and 
redemptions from them." LC. §40-805 (emphasis added). 
Thus, pursuant to the JP A, the City has pled that it is entitled to the ad valorem tax, which 
includes penalties and interest collected on properties within the City limits. (if44( c ), R. p. 27) 
As a result, the City asked that the declaratory relief to which it was entitled include an order that 
IHD transfer all tax revenues, to include penalties and interest. (if 51 (b ), R. p. 29) It is 
undisputed that IHD previously paid to the City all delinquent taxes owed, as they were paid. It 
makes no sense that the accompanying interest and penalties for those delinquent taxes are not 
similarly paid over to the City. 
IHD's assertion that an ambiguity exists would require this Court to ignore the entirety of 
the terms used in the JPA and LC. §40-805. IHD's claim of alternate interpretations that taxes, 
and only taxes, are included would be reasonable only if the word "tax" were used. "All property 
tax funds" has to have a meaning beyond "property taxes," and "all tax revenues" has to have a 
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meaning beyond "all taxes"; contracts are interpreted to give effect to all te1ms used, and comis 
will not render terms superfluous or meaningless. Parma Seed. Inc. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, 
94 Idaho 658, 665, 496 P.2d 281 (1972); Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 
Idaho 223,233,939 P.2d 542 (1997). The definitions offered by IHD of the term "tax" alone do 
not apply to the phrases used, nor the tax monies which are required to be paid to IHD to include 
penalties and interest. 
Instead, the District Court's analysis of "all" was appropriate. The court found that "all" 
1s defined as "the whole number, quantity, or amount." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary, p. 71 (1983). The term "tax" "embraces all governmental impositions 
on ... property ... " Black's Law Dictionary (91h ed. 2009). Revenue is defined as "[g]ross income 
or receipts." Id. A definition of the plural form of "fund" is "available pecuniary resources." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 498 (1983). Thus, "all tax revenues" or "all 
property tax funds" would encompass the gross amount of money collected for IHD from City 
residents in relation to the ad valorem tax. (R p. 280-281) 
The gross amount of funds collected for the benefit of IHD includes interest and costs of 
delinquent taxes. Under LC. §40-805, which directs the county tax collector regarding highway 
district taxes, the county is to "[p]ay over all moneys then due to the district, including all the 
district's proportionate amount of the delinquent taxes, interest and costs on all tax sales and 
redemptions from them." LC. 40-805. If "all moneys" encompass interest and penalties, then so 
should too the largely synonymous "all tax revenues" or "all property tax funds" utilized in the 
Agreement. 
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Moreover, whether or not IHD has previously paid those amounts to the City is irrelevant 
to the contractual obligation, and the act of paying or not paying does not created an issue of fact 
to defeat summary judgment. The only issue on appeal is a question of law for the court to 
detem1ine whether the definition of the ad valorem property taxes collected by IHD under the 
statute includes interest and penalties, and whether the express tenns of the JP A to pay all tax 
revenues agreed to the City include penalties and interest. Because this was simply a matter of 
contract interpretation and statutory construction, both of which are issues of law, no genuine 
issue of fact for trial exists. See, Dept. of Health, supra; Farm Bureau, supra. The District Court 
is entitled to apply common sense to the interpretation of the contract. See, Armstrong v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139, 143 P.3d 737 (2006) ("given a common sense 
interpretation, there is no ambiguity" in contract). 
b. Sufficient evidence that the penalties and interest was owing existed to 
include that in the declaratory relief. 
IHD also argues that there existed insufficient evidence of the amount of past due tax, 
precluding summary judgment. This ignores the nature of the declaratory relief sought here by 
the City, and the fact that all records which would quantify the amounts were in the possession of 
IHD.6 
In a declaratory judgment, courts of record have the power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. I. C. § 10-1201. This 
6 The City has no reason to doubt IHD will fully comply with the ruling of this Court and pay what is due without 
the necessity of additional litigation. 
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includes the construction of contracts, before or after breach. LC. §10-1203. Contrary to IHD's 
claim, a breach of contract is not required for the issuance of a declaratory judgment regarding a 
contract dispute. ABC Agra LLC v. Critical Access Group. Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 331 P.3d 523 
(2014). In a declaratory judgment proceeding, the court has jurisdiction to both construe a 
contract and to award damages. Sweeney v. American Nat. Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 
(1941 ). The District Court here had sufficient evidence to establish that IHD was required to pay 
penalties and interest with taxes in accordance with the JP A as a matter of law, and it declared 
that right to relief in a summary judgment. The only monetary relief was the award of fees. 
Thus, no additional evidence of an exact quantification was necessary, and no issue of fact 
existed to preclude that declaratory relief, and no basis exists to reverse it now. 
3.4 A permanent injunction has yet to be entered. 
IHD's argument about the form of the permanent injunction is emblematic of the 
scattershot approach to the appeal. It also appears to be an example of no good deed goes 
unpunished. Early in the case, the parties stipulated to the entry of a preliminary injunction, 
which has remained in effect. The Court's Judgment dated November 24, 2014 merely recites 
that a permanent injunction will enter. Before the Court could consider the f01m of the 
permanent injunction, IHD moved on December 8, 2014 to alter or amend the judgment for 
numerous reasons, but also pointing out the order was not a permanent injunction. (R. 
Supplemental Record, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, p. 4) The order denying the motion was entered on April 10, 2014. (R. p. 388-390) 
This appeal was then in play. The District Court has not yet entered a permanent injunction and 
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such has not been necessary to date as II-ID continues to comply with is undertaking per the 
stipulated Preliminary Injunction. The issue on the form of the injunction is not yet before this 
court. 
3.5 IHD is estopped from taking a position inconsistent with its act of entering 
into the Joint Powers Agreement. 
The City offered estoppel as additional reasons below for the rejecting the arguments of 
II-ID. The District Court did not have to turn to those arguments. They are repeated on appeal as 
additional and alternative reasons for rejecting the appeal. See, Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 
870, 187 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2008) (an appellate com1 may affirm a lower court's decision on a 
legal theory different from the one applied by the lower court). The doctrine of estoppel may be 
used against a highway district to prevent it from taking a position inconsistent with previous 
actions, in order to prevent manifest injustice; the Supreme Court approved this very legal 
principal in Sandpoint I, 126 Idaho at 151. See also, Mm1augh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls 
Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 260,268, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). 
a. IHD is judicially estopped from reversing its position on the stipulated 
settlement which the court approved. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a pai1y from advantageously taking one position, then 
subsequently offering a second position that is incompatible with the first. Hoagland v. Ada 
County, 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013). Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
exists to protect the dignity of judicial process, and is invoked by the court at its discretion. Id. 
Generally, when a litigant obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, he 
will not thereafter be pennitted to repudiate such by means of inconsistent and contrary 
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allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right against another party arising out of the 
same transaction or subject matter. Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, 
LLC, 147 Idaho 737,748,215 P.3d 457 (2009). The doctrine is intended to prevent patties from 
playing "fast and loose" with the legal system. Id. 
In Hoagland, a plaintiff had dismissed state law claims including wrongful death, based 
on representations to the presiding judge that she was preceding entirely on § 1983 claims; on 
appeal, the plaintiff attempted to resun-ect wrongful death state claims which she had voluntarily 
dismissed. The court found that the representation to the court which established the basis for 
dismissal estopped the plaintiff from pursuing the claim. When a party has taken a position 
before the com1, it may not thereafter pursue an action based on an inconsistent position. 
Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, 154 Idaho 486, 300 P.3d 18-29 (2013). In Buckskin, 
counsel for Valley County expressed in oral argument that certain resolutions would not be 
rescinded, and that the County would not enforce the provisions of a capital contribution 
agreement requiring the payment of compensation for future phases of a project. Based on those 
representations, the court found the developer's claim for declaratory relief moot. Thereafter, the 
County began to assert a contrary legislative or contractual scheme to enforce the contributions 
to the detriment of the opposing party. The court found the County was judicially estopped from 
changing its position on the legislative scheme. 
Just as in Hoagland and Buckskin, IHD here made specific representations to this Court 
in the filed stipulated settlement, which included by its nature counsel's representation that the 
agreements were legal, and a proper basis for the Court's Order of Dismissal. I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l). 
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IHD now seeks to repudiate all of the terms of the stipulation, including the JP A. The court 
should exercise its discretion to prevent IHD from asserting the invalidity of the JP A, which was 
the basis for this Court to dismiss the City of Sandpoint's action in Sandpoint II, and rendered 
moot the election to dissolve that was permitted by Sandpoint III. In the Stipulation on which 
the dismissal was based, IHD represented that the interests of the taxpayer and road users would 
best be served by a continuation of the arrangement in which the City maintained the streets 
within its boundary, that IHD would maintain all streets outside the City but within IHD 
boundaries, and IHD capped its obligation to the City by disbursing 100% of the tax revenues to 
the City for that purpose; the JP A was to be executed memorializing these agreements. The 
paities also stipulated that continued litigation on the dissolution action would be costly and not 
in the best interests of the public, and the court dismissed based on that Stipulation. These are 
significant representations IHD should not now be allowed to abandon. 
IHD's current claim that the JP A is not valid or enforceable is clearly an inconsistent 
position to the one taken before this Court that was enunciated solely to halt the dissolution 
election. To preserve the integrity of the system, IHD should be judicially estopped from 
pursuing a completely contrary position which it took before this Comt. 
b. IHD should also be equitably estopped from claiming that the JP A is 
unenforceable. 
Equitable estoppel requires "that the offending party must have gained some advantage or 
caused a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel; induced the party seeking estoppel to 
change its position to its detriment; and it must be unconscionable to allow the offending party to 
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maintain a position which is inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a 
benefit." Sandpoint I, 126 Idaho at 151. 
IHD claims specific terms of the JP A render it unenforceable, and claims it is overall 
unconstitutional. This position is entirely inconsistent with IHD's act of entering into the 
Stipulation and the JP A. IHD obtained the advantage and benefit of avoiding litigation that 
would have resulted in an election likely to dissolve it. It agreed to provide a specific 
apportionment of taxes pursuant to a JP A to avoid that result. It induced the City to forego that 
dissolution election and agree not to block any additional annexation by IHD. IHD devised the 
benefit of the JPA for ten (10) years before it unilaterally terminated its obligations. It is now 
unconscionable to allow IHD to repudiate its prior position. See, Sandpoint I, supra. 
3.6 Attorney fees were authorized by statute, and the amount awarded was not 
an abuse of the District Court's discretion. 
An award of fees to a prevailing party in an action involving a political subdivision 
pursuant to I. C. § 12-117 is within the sound discretion of the District Court and will be disturbed 
only for an abuse of that discretion. Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 323 P.3d 
1252 (Ct. App. 2014). The burden is on the party disputing a fee award to establish that the court 
abused its discretion. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,484, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006). 
On appeal, IHD basically claims that the City should not have prevailed on the 
constitutional question, nor should it have been awarded damages on summary judgment, and 
thus should not have been awarded fees under I.C. § 12-117. Although somewhat unclear as to 
why, IHD also maintains it was e1Tor for the comi to award fees even if this court were to affirm 
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the District Court's analysis as to the constitutional issues. (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 52) 
However, as noted by the District Court in its memorandum decision on IHD's Motion for 
Reconsideration, IHD did not object to LC. § 12-117 as the basis for the award of fees. 
(R. Supplemental Record, Memorandum Decision, p. 4) That code provides that attorney fees 
"shall" be awarded to the prevailing party in civil proceedings between governmental entities; it 
is undisputed that this action qualifies. See, LC. §12-117(4).7 The comi thus had a proper 
statutory authority for the award of fees, and IHD's only complaint can be in the court's exercise 
of discretion in the amount, and it fails to prove any abuse of that discretion. 
When a District Court awards fees it considers a variety of factors under 
LR. C.P. 54( e )(3 ), including novelty and difficulty of the issues, requisite skill and experience of 
the lawyer, the prevailing charges for "like work," the amount involved and result obtained, and 
any other factors which the court deems appropriate. IHD's appeal fails to properly review all of 
the relevant factors, instead focusing on three: 1) the time spent; 2) the skill required performing 
the legal service; and 3) the prevailing charge for like work. IHD's position understates the 
magnitude and complexity of the issues it raised in the District Court, which were reflected in the 
time spent and hourly rate. IHD also fails to establish a lower prevailing rate for "like work" in 
the area. IHD also does not comment on the City's vulnerable position in providing a vital 
7 While IHD recites the fact that the District Court originally awarded fees before IHD could timely lodge an 
objection, the District Court admitted that error, and reconsidered IHD's objection before the final award of fees. 
(R. Supplemental Record Memorandum Decision, p. 5) No prejudice resulted from the procedural defect, and the 
"manner" of the award does not alter the fact that the court found that the City prevailed and exercised its discretion 
as to the amount. 
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service to its citizens when IHD took its position in this case and then filed its Motion to 
Dismiss. The necessity of an immediate and successful legal intervention is not accounted for in 
IHD's appeal of the amount awarded. And significantly, IHD does not acknowledge the need for 
active participation by the City Attorney whose efforts were not included in the fee request. All 
of the relevant factors establish that the court properly awarded the fees. 
a. The issues IHD presented were complex and the need for immediate 
and successful resolution was of high priority; the lack of a fully 
litigated case does not render the amount of time spent unreasonable. 
IHD analyzes the hours spent on specific tasks, and concludes it was too much by 
claiming the issues were not complex, and averaging time spent on briefs to come to a "per page" 
figure. IHD's claim that the pleadings were "standard" and time spent excessive is simply a 
conclusion that does not render the court's award an abuse of discretion. 
The "bottom line" in an award of fees is the reasonableness of the amount awarded. 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 433, 196 P.3d 341 (2008). While this matter did not 
necessitate discovery, in essence, the issues were fully vetted during presentation of the Motion 
to Dismiss but were then challenged on additional basis in the Summary Judgment. The original 
Complaint sought declaratory relief regarding matters which had been the subject of extensive 
previous litigation. IHD's motion to dismiss all claims joined every issue in the case, and 
necessitated extensive effort to establish the City's right to relief. The Court's extensive order 
denying the motion to dismiss, tested ( and decided) the merits of a complex constitutional and 
statutory right to possession of tax revenue between the City and IHD. In fact, IHD believed the 
status of the litigation was concluded sufficiently and was immediately appealable. When 
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interlocutory appeal was denied, summary judgment had to be presented and several of the 
earlier rulings by this Court were reargued by IHD. 
Thus, contrary to IHD's claim that the amount of fees expended was unreasonable for a 
case that had not proceeded to trial, the District Court's analysis of the novelty and difficulty of 
the constitutional questions posed which effected all citizens within the boundaries of IHD, well 
establish the necessity for and the result of the extensive effort put forth by counsel. This case 
involved IHD's novel theories that Idaho's constitutional and statutory tax scheme precluded the 
settlement agreement it had reached after three lawsuits concerning appo11ionment of public 
funds between municipalities for the necessary public service of road maintenance. This case 
required extensive analysis of the 20-year history of serial litigation, legislative history research, 
in addition to addressing the multiple issues raised. The fact that a total of 118 hours to bring the 
case to conclusion is neither unreasonable nor excessive in light of these factors; this constitutes 
just over three weeks of attorney effort. 
Similarly, the hours spent on the appealability issue and the response on the interlocutory 
appeal were necessitated by IHD's belief that review was then appropriate, which the City 
properly analyzed as incorrect. Because of the need for immediate and speedy resolution and 
believing review would not be accepted on the status of the Court's rulings, the City then 
proceeded to summary judgment. Despite IHD's claim that the Summary Judgment motion 
merely repeated the law on the Motion to Dismiss, IHD's position was to oppose that motion 
based on a variety of new arguments ( along with the previous ones) in an attempt to assert that 
there remained issues for trial to defeat the motion. It is disingenuous to say the time spent on 
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the summary judgment was wholly duplicative when IHD opposed it and refused to stipulate 
based on claims that there existed additional issues to be addressed at trial. 
Ultimately, the time spent constituted the reason that the City achieved the results in this 
case and respectfully that effo1i was well within reason. 
b. The hourly rates were within the discretion of the court to award 
based on the nature and complexity of issues, and the experience of 
counsel. 
While IHD agrees that it is appropriate to analyze the skill and experience of the attorney 
in a particular field, as well as the prevailing charge for like work, in reality it discounts the 
experience of the primary counsel as unimp01iant, and suggests the comi erred in analyzing the 
length of time in practice by comparing the lesser experience of those attorneys offering 
affidavits regarding their hourly rates. In reality, IHD fails to create any claim that the court 
abused its discretion in awarding the fees incurred based on any lack of appropriate skill or 
experience. 8 
And in challenging the hourly rate charged by the City's counsel, IHD ignores the Court's 
requirement to review not only the prevailing rate in the area, but rather the prevailing rate for 
"like work." See, I.R.C.P. §54(e)(3)(D). The pertinent geographic region from which to draw 
the prevailing rate includes any area from which it is reasonable for the client to have engaged 
8 While IHD appears to suggest the lack of Ms. Anderson's Idaho license somehow rendered the amount of fees 
awarded inappropriate, or suggests a lack of skill necessary to address the issues, this ignores the result obtained. 
lHD also cites no authority for the conclusion that no prevailing rate exists for a Spokane attorney working in an 
Idaho case; Idaho law does not preclude the practice of law by out of state counsel when aligned with Idaho licensed 
counsel, and presumably, if the practice is appropriate, there is a prevailing rate for it. See, RPC 5.5(b )(2)(iii). 
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counsel. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 751-52, 185 P.3d 258 (2008). In this instance, 
this action involved two local public entities, and each chose to obtain counsel from outside the 
area - - Boise and Spokane. This was reasonable based on the nature of the claims and the 
likelihood of potential conflicts with attorneys from the same locality; cities and counties often 
seek representation outside of their own boundaries. Thus, the affidavits from practitioners only 
in Sandpoint and Coeur d'Alene do not necessarily render the rates requested by the City's 
counsel as "not prevailing." 
Indeed, when issues are as unique as those faced by the City, the Court is entitled to take 
that into account on the prevailing rate for "like work." The rates cited by IHD in Ms. Weeks' 
affidavit and in the affidavits filed by Mr. Featherston and Mr. Marfice do not analyze fees 
relative to constitutional and statutory municipal corporate litigation, but primarily quote rates 
these attorneys charge for "complex" litigation and "non-complex" litigation. It was unknown in 
this record the specific nature of their practices, but at least some of their practices appeared to 
consist of different work such as wills and estates, insurance defense or other unrelated types of 
litigation. IHD failed to establish that these hourly rates, as supported by the original 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees submitted by the City, are not prevailing for "like work," or that 
the District Court abused its discretion in so analyzing this. 
Moreover, the prevailing hourly rate is but one of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e), 
and the Court can simply detennine the "bottom line" amount was reasonable based on factors in 
addition to the hourly rate. An award need not be based on hourly time sheets, "as the amount of 
time spent is but one of several factors to be considered in awarding fees." Hackett v. Streeter, 
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109 Idaho 261,263, 706 P.2d 1372 (Ct. App. 1985). The novelty and difficulty of the question, 
the requisite skill and experiences of the attorney, and the time limitations imposed by the 
circumstances of the case all dictate that the Court's overall award here was appropriate, without 
reduction for the sole factor of hourly rate analysis. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the amount involved and the 
results obtained under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G), and IHD's conclusion that it gave undue weight to 
that factor is not borne out by the record. The court's opinion instead analyzed a number of 
factors and specifically found the fees reasonable: "Considering the hourly rate charged and the 
amount of time billed ... as well as all the other I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A-L) factors, which this court 
has considered." (R. Supplemental Records, Memorandum Decision, p. 8) So long as the record 
indicates all factors were considered, the trial court need not specifically address all the factors in 
writing. Medical Rec. Serv., LLC v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 107, 175 P.3d 795 (Ct. App. 2007). 
It is also not accurate that there was no evidence to support the District Court's analysis 
of the amount involved in this action or results obtained. While there may not have been a 
specific quantification of the dollar value to the City in tax revenues, the District Court had the 
lengthy litigation history in the record, and the declaratory action established the results the City 
obtained - - the tax revenues generated within its borders to maintain its streets. That outcome is 
substantiated. There is no evidence to support IHD's assertion that the District Court awarded 
excessive fees as a "punitive" matter based on the outcome. The District Court simply 
recognized the impmtance of the outcome to the City as a factor, and it was within its discretion 
to understand the litigation history to comprehend the importance. 
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c. Other factors establish the reasonableness of the amount of the 
award. 
The Com1 is also entitled to consider "any other factor" it deems appropriate when 
calculating the amount of fees. I.R.C.P. §54(e); Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 
22-23, 278 P.3d 415 (2012). Here, although the Sandpoint City attorney brought this action and 
participated in the litigation, the City did not seek fees for that time, although the statute would 
entitle the agency to its fees as well. See, I.C. §12-117; see also In re Dunmire, 100 Idaho 697, 
699-700, 604 P.2d 711 (1979) (salaried attorney working for governmental or public agency may 
be awarded fees). In addition, the high public import of getting the relief the City needed to fund 
street maintenance for the coming winter rendered this case high priority for its inside and 
outside counsel, necessitating immediate and sole focus on the pursuit of the necessary relief. 
The City's success in its pursuit of relief is also an appropriate consideration. These factors also 
rendered the amount awarded reasonable. 
3. 7 The appeal will be denied on the merits, but irrespective, no basis exists to 
order a new trial judge for any remaining proceedings below. 
Forum shopping is not favored; unhappy with the rulings made as a matter of law, IHD 
wants this Court to give it a chance with a new judge. However, the case will substantively be 
resolved on appeal; either the core documents are legal or not and both sides asked for ruling on 
that issue as a matter of law. The argument of remand with a different judge is of no moment in 
this appeal. More fundamental, the argument is legally and factually flawed. 
First, IHD rests its desire for a new judge on remand on claims of apparent bias based on 
the court's rulings. These rulings were within the District Court's discretion, were properly based 
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on the law and the evidence before it, and provide no evidence of bias or bases for remand. 
Moreover, this is IHD's second ride on the new judge train. IHD already filed an affidavit to 
recuse assigned trial Judge Buchanan without cause under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l), on August 22, 2013 
and was granted reassignment to District Court Judge Mitchell. (R. p. 48) To give IHD the 
opportunity to request yet another new judge would unde1mine the purpose of Rule 40( d)(l ), 
prejudice the City, and frustrate the desire for judicial economy. 
Moreover, the Idaho courts do not routinely assign a new judge on remand, and the 
circumstances are extremely limited.9 In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 
411,283 P.3d 728 (2012), the appellate court specified the long and complex history oflitigation 
as a basis for a new remand judge, a factor not present here. The Capstar court also noted that 
disqualification on the basis of bias rested with the judicial officer. Here, if IHD is claiming 
actual bias, disqualification is the appropriate remedy, a remedy IHD apparently recognizes as 
inappropriate. 
Here, the district court's rulings speak for themselves, and the "parade" of alleged 
improprieties will be borne out in this appeal as appropriate rulings, which cannot be 
characterized as "ridiculous," entitling IHD to a new judge, as in Sky Canyon Properties LLC v. 
The Golf Club at Black Rock. LLC, 2015 WL 5719996 (Idaho 2015). 10 Here, the district court 
9 This policy is generally accepted; a new judge on remand should be ordered only "under extreme circumstances." 
Weinstein, The Limited Power of Federal Courts of Appeal to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 
120 F.R.D. 267 (1988). 
IO The Sky Canyon court did not in fact actually so "characterize" the court's rulings; a concurring opinion instead 
uses that term in passing; the Court in actuality gave no reasoning for assigning a new judge on remand. 
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simply disagreed with the legal positions taken by IHD; if such disagreement constitutes a basis 
for a new judge, every remand will require the same relief. 
4. Attorney's Fees Should be Awarded on Appeal. 
The City requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal under LC. §§12-117(4) which 
allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing paiiy in any judicial proceeding between 
governmental entities. The City prevailed below, and will prevail here, entitling it to fees on 
appeal. 
Further, attorney's fees may be granted under LC. § 12-121 to the prevailing party and 
such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has 
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Total Success 
Investments. LLC v. Ada Cty. Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942 (Ct. App. 
2010). Here, IHD raises a host of issues on appeal, none of which is grounded in legal or factual 
merit. IHD makes unsupported claims and misconstrues the record to continue its attempt at 
avoiding the fundamental truth in this case - IHD has a contractual obligation it failed to 
perform. The long history of IHD failing to meet its obligations should not end with IHD being 
rewarded for unreasonably extending the time and expense of this litigation. 
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] 
5. Conclusion. 
For the foregoing reasons, the record and controlling law, this Court is asked to deny the 
appeal in its entirety and award the City of Sandpoint its fees and costs on appeal. 
qy-( 
DATED this_,_!_:_ _ day of December, 2015. 
WANDERSEN 
CASHATT, LA WYERS P.S. 
SCOT R. CAMPBELL 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9111 day of December, 2015, I caused a copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief to be served by Federal Express, and addressed to: 
David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
-Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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June 24, 2003 
City of Sandpoint 
Attn: Mayor Ray Miller 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
BRUCE H. GREENE, P.A. 
Attorney At Law 
320 North Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-1255 
FAX (208) 265-2451 
VIA FACSIMILE ONLY TO .263M3678 
Re: Sandpoint lndepende.nt Highwqy District 
Dear Mayor: 
To avoid any further confusion (hopefully) the settlement offer pending is as follows: 
I) SIBJ) would agree to a stipulated court settlement giving Sandpoint jurisdiction over its' 
streets, despite the Supreme Court ruling. 
2) SIHD would waive the costs award fo the Supreme Court decision. 
3) SIHD would agree.by Joint Powers Agreement to share its' property tax:revenues ·with the 
City annually. The District would pay over to the City all the property tax funds received from the 
residents of the District who are also inside the City. The JP A could also cover a number of other 
things, e.g., plo,ving, grading, hauling services, etc. which you might need as$i$tance on. The tax 
revenues would vary annuallY., but right now would approximate $175,000. I don't have the exact 
figure before me - but it is in:the documents earlier furnished. 
4) The City would in tum-agree - as would Bonner County- that the dissolution election be 
vacated. 
S) The County would be further agreeing that annexation elections go forward (1,aturallyyou 
would not be able to dictate to the County; you would sii::qply agree as part of the stipulation with the 
County that such eleotion be vacated and annexations be approved. 
.a •\.·,l 
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Attn: Mayor Ray Miller 
JQ.ne24, 2003 
Pag:e.2 
.. v.J'-'O n . ,.:u,.c:,cn:,, r . I'\.. 6UO .&t:,•.) .&11:0 l 
Those would be the essential terms of the settlement proposal. As we discussed there would be other 
benefits from settling as opposed to ongoing Wiigation and poiitioldng> but those are intangibles that 
don•t need to be in a settlement agreement. 
The District awaits your response this Thursday morning. .Hopefully these two entities can start 
cooperating. If the peacemakers are given a chance for a few years we may well look back in surprise 
as to why we had struggled against each other so long. · 
The District will meet in executive session after we hear your response. 
Yours very tmly, 
~~ 
BRUCE H. GREENE 
Counsel for SIBD 
BHG/bw 
cc: SIHD 
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Scott W. Re~d, lSB#818 
Attorney at Law 
'.P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Afone. ID 83816 
Phone (ZOS) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765 .. 5117 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN TliE DISTlUCT CO'OltT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL lllSTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF XPAllO, JN AND FOR TRE dOUNTY OF 'SONNER 
Cll'f OF SANDPOINT, a munici_put 
corputafion or the State of IdahaJ . 
Plaintlrt, 
11s. 
·SANDPOINT IN.DEPENDENT 
HrGnwAv nxsnucr, a. politic.al 
subdivh;ion ot the State of' IdRho, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STIPULATION F'Oll S~TI'L,EMENT 
Plaintiff Ci~ of Sandpoint and defendant Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District; acting through respective counsel and with the approval of 
tho governing board of each present to the Court the following :findings: 
1. In this case, the jud~ent of District Judge James F. Judd granting 
summary judgment 'to the City of Sandpoint entered November 28, 2000 
awarded to the. City of Sandpoint exclusive jurisdiction and control of 
maintenance of all streots within the city limits of the Ciiy of Sandpoint. 
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· 2. Since entry of that judgment, t11e City of Sandpoint. with a fully 
fonctior.Jng street department, has maintained. the streets. 
3. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District has jurisdiction and 
control certain streets and roads outside of the city limits. 
4, The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District have cooperated in the funding of certain projects within the city limits. 
5. The Sandpoint lndependent Highway District h~ be.en providing 
se~ces to the City of Ponderay and the Cit.Y of Dover and.has sought through 
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners to annex both cities. The county 
has deferred action upon the annexations. 
6. On.June 19~ 20031 the Xdaha Supreme Court. reversed the judgment 
of Judge Judd remanding this case to the district court. Idaho Supreme Cour.t 
Docket No. 27441. 
1. fo. a companion case, Sandpoint Independent Highway District v. 
Board of"Commissi.oners of .Bonnet Gaunt}~ in which the City of Sandpoint i~ 
an intervenor, Distric.t Judge James F. Judd enterod partia..1 summary judgment 
on December 29, 2000 affinning thei o:rder of the Bonner· County 
Commissioners that an election on di!:'l~olufion of the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District should be held. Bonner County Case No. CV-00·00788, 
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8. Sandpoint 1ndependent Highway District made timely appeal. On 
June 4~ 2003 the Idaho Supreme Court entered an opinion which in part 
affirmed the order of Judge Judd directing that a dissolution. election should 
be held. Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 27194. 
9. The opinion.of the Idaho Supreme Court .remanded the ease to the 
Bonner County :Soard of Commissioners which is n0w considering setting a 
date for a dissolution election. 
10. The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District havo now determfoed, based upon their respective experiences witb. 
street control and maintenanc~ engaged in each since the district court decision 
was. entered and the Cify of Sandpoint assumed jurisdiction and controli that 
the interests of the taxpayers within the re~pective entities and of the road 
users would best 'be serted by .c.ontinuation of the present ar-ra.n-gemeut. Based 
upon the experience of the past three years, it is agreed that the City of 
.Sandpoint should maintain f.ts own streets and the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway bistrk,t should oontinue in existence 'with the opportunity to expand 
. 
to neighboring cities by annexation. 
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11. The respective parties concur in the be;lief that continued litigation 
and tho :anticipat~d· dissolu.tkm election would be costly and would not be in 
the best interest& 0f the public, 
Based upon these findings, the parties stipulate and agree to the 
following; 
1. The City. of Sandpoint shall retain jurisdiction and oontrol over a.11 
streets now within its -city limits -and as may subsequently b.e, annexed into the 
city, Recognition of the city jurisdiction $hall be set forth in a jotnt powers 
agreement as ,p:ro:vide.d hereafter. 
2. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District and the City of 
Sandpoint ~hall enter into a joint powers agreement made pursuant to Chapter 
23, Title 67, Idaho Code which wilt provide for division of an ad valorem funds 
recei"Ved under Chaptet 8, Titie 401 Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreeme'tlt 
is intended to be a permanent resolution subje.ct to termination only by mutual . 
.. 
agreem~nt 0£ both parties. The division of funds ·shall be made twice yea-rly. 
The jo1nt powers agreement would provide tha.t the- Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District pay- o-ver to the City of Sandpoint all ad vru.orem property tax 
funds received from levies by the District -upon all property-Located within tbe 
city limits. The joint powers agreement would cover other matters as ar·e 
appropriate. The tax revenues from district levies upon property within the city 
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limits received in the currem: fiscal year shall be paid by the District to the City . 
commencing with th.;: 2003 leV'/. 
3. 'rhe City of Sandpoint> which joined as a pe.titioner in seeking the 
dissolution election, would now .request the :Sonner County Board .of 
Commissioners to vacate th.e dissolution elec.tfon and stipulate to dismiss case 
No, CV-00-007 .. '3e: With prejudice, 
4. The City of-Sandpoint will not oppose annexation elections sought 
by the Sandpoint Ihde.pendent Highway District~ 
5. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District would W~ive costs 
awarded on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441. 
6. The. parties will immediat~ly proceed to enter into a joint powers 
a.greeme~t to carry out the terms of this s1.1pulation for settlement. 
7, This ea.se may be dismissed wttll prejudice, with each party to bear 
i:ts own costs and attorney's fees, 
',:-...:.::a..-:rit.,7.tt-'4'0"-........ 
Dated this -2_ d~y of July, 2003. (· 
,.,-,·~ . \ / 
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L . Scott W. Reed __ 
Bruce H, Gre~ne 
Attorney for Sandpointindepe-ndent 
Highway District 
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Between 
THE CITY OF SANDPOINT 
And the 
EXHIBITB 0 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
RECITALS 
This Joint Powers Agreement is made this £ day of July, 2003, between 
the Sandpoint Independent Highway District, P. 0. Box 1047, Sandpoint;J Idaho 
83864 (hereinafter referred to as 11DISTRICT11), and the City of Sandpoint, 1123 
Lake Street~ Sandpoint., Idaho 83864 (hereinafter referred to as 11CITY"), who enter 
this _agreement pursuant to the provisions, terms and conditions of Idaho Chapter 23: 
Title 67, Idaho Code. 
DURATION: 
PREAMBLE: 
PURPOSE: 
JURISDICTION, 
MAJNTENANCE 
The duration of this agreement shall be perpetual or until 
such time as the District and the City jointly and together 
· agree to amend or ten:ninate the same. · 
The parties have entered into a stipulation filed of record 
in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District, Bonner County Case No. CV-00-00615 which 
provides for execution of this joint powers agreement. 
The purpose of this agreement is to divide the jurisdiction, 
maintenance and- control of streets and public rights of 
way within the boundaries of the district between the 
District and the City and provide for sharing of ad 
valorem tax revenue. 
AND CONTROL: The City shall exercise exclusive general supervisory authority 
over all the streets and public rights of way within the city 
limits of the City of Sandpoint including any property 
subsequently annexed. 
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SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY: 
TOTNT POWRR~ AnRR'):;l\lfRNT 
Between 
THE CITY OF SA1\1DP0INT 
And the 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
The District shall exercise exclusive general supervisory 
authority over all streets and public rights of way within 
the boundaries of the District lying outside of the city 
limits of the City of Sandpoint. 
The supervisory authority of the City and of the District, 
each within the boundaries described above, shall include 
the following: 
1. Acquisitions, vacations and abandonments. 
2. Acceptance of streets and rights ofyvay. 
3. Construction, creation and opening of streets and 
rights ofways. 
4. Extension~ modifications and realignments of same. 
5. Controlling access to streets and rights of ways,, 
encroachment pennits. 
6. Design and use standards. 
7. Traffic control, striping and sign.age. 
8. Review of proposed subdivisions as regards to 
streets and storm drain systems and inspection of 
construction as the same proceeds. 
9. Sidewalks. 
10. Parking. 
11. Street lights and such-utilities as may be located 
within the public streets and right of way. 
12. All ordinary and necessary maintenance of streets 
and rights of way. 
13. Franchise involving street rights of way. 
14. Police regulations. 
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JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT 
Between 
THE CITY OF SANDPOINT 
And the 
SANDPOTI-.JT INDEPE:N1)ENT HIGHWAY DISTR1CT 
REVENUE 
DISTRIBUTION: 1. 
2. 
Exercise of the above supervisory authority does not 
preclude cooperation between the entities for the common 
benefit of the residents. Cooperation and shared services 
will be expected. 
The City will have the :final say over all street matters 
within its boundaries, and the District over those streets 
outside the City. 
The District at the present time and in the future will levy 
and apply for ad valorem property taxes under the 
authority granted in Chapter 13:, Title 49, Idaho Code. The 
District will pay over to the City all property tax funds 
from such District levies on all property located within the 
city limits. 
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently 
approximately $350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of 
tax revenues, forward to the City all tax revenues 
received by the District collected from properties within 
the City on November 1st, February 1st, May 1st and 
August 1st respectively. The first required payment 
herein shall commence with the funds budgeted for 2003, 
and receivable in January 2004. This shall include 
transfer of funds in 2003, when such money is available 
and not already committed by the District. 
District agrees to additionally provide highway services 
with or without equipment within the City. Such services 
may include regular maintenance, assistance on special 
projects, or other assistance as may be agreed to by the 
City's Public Works Director or Mayor, and the Dis1rict's 
Board of Directors or Foreman. Services to be provided 
will be on an as needed and as available basis. 
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JOINT PO"WERS AGREEMENT 
Between 
THE CITY OF SANDPOJNT 
And the 
SAJIDPOil~T INDEPEi\/"DEN'T HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
COOPERATION: The parties recognize that road maintenance requirements on 
occasion require more personnel and equipment than the 
responsible entity may have at that time. The parties 
agree to share personnel and equipment upon an as 
needed and available basis for road maintenance projects 
within the city limits of Sandpoint. 
INDEMNIFICATION: 
PERSONNEL: 
1. City agrees to defend> indemnify and hold harmless 
the District from all liability or expense on account of 
claims, suits, and costs growing out of or connected with 
the City's negligent or wrongful exercise of rights granted 
herein, if any, provided the District will not be relieved of 
liability for its own wrongful acts and negligence and that 
of its employees, agents, and assigns. 
2. District agrees to indemnify, defend and bold the 
City hamtless from all liabilities, judgments, costs, 
damages and expenses which may accrue against, be 
charged to, or recovered from City by reason of or on 
account of damage to City property, or the property of, 
injury to, or death of any person, when such damage or 
injruy is caused by District's employees:, subcontractors, 
or agents while within the City for maintenance or other 
District work. 
The parties agree that District personnel operating within 
the City are in no way employees or agents of City and 
are not entitled.to worker's compensation or any benefit of 
employment with the City, and that City personnel are in 
no way employees or agents of District and are not 
entitled to worker's compensation or any benefit of 
employment with the District. 
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JOINT POWERS AGREE~.IBNT 
Between 
THE CITY OF SANDPOINT 
And the 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
DISSOLUTION: This Agreement v\lill automatically terminate if the District is 
dissolved. It will also terminate jf the City supports any 
future petition for dissolution of District. 
SEVERAB1LITY 
CLAUSE: If any portion of this Agreement is held to be invalid or 
unenforceable for any reason, the remaining provisions 
shall continue to be valid and enforceable. If a Court 
finds that any provision of this Agreement is invalid or 
unenforceable, but that by limiting such provision, it 
would become valid and enforceable, then such provision 
shall be deemed to be written, construed, _and enforced as 
·so limited. · 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the District, by and through its commissioners 
and the City, by and through its Mayor and City Clerk have executed this 
Agreement to be effective the first date indicated above. 
DATED this !i.!!: day of July:, 2003. 
HIGBWA Y DISTRICT 
~ARD OF COMMISSIONERS ~ __ h · an 
C::onnnissioner 
CITY OF SANDPOINT 
-5-
0 41. 
0-
' 1 
I 
J 
lJ 
'.J 
J.. 
~·~·-· 
I 
_J 
EXHIBIT C 
No: 05-47 
Date: August 17, 2005 
RESOLUTION 
OF THE CITY COUNCIL 
CiTY OF SANDPOINT 
TITLE: INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
WHEREAS: The Independent Highway District has title to the streets and rights-of-way 
within the city but by mutual agreement the city has control of all streets 
and rights~o~-ways within the city; and, 
WHEREAS: ft has become necessary to simplify and clarify the process of vacating 
streets and rights--of-way within the City limits by notifying the Independent 
Highway District prior to public hearing to allow the District to object. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Independent Highway District and the City of Sandpoint, a 
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully 
incorporated herein, be approved and the mayor and City Clerk be 
authorized to execute same on behalf of the City. 
ATTEST: 
~.p~ 
Maree Peck, City Clerk 
City Council Members: 
1. Elliott Motion 
2. Ogilvie Second 
3. Boge 
4. Burgstahler 
5. Spickelmire 
6. Lamson 
YES NO ABSTAIN ABSENT 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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MEl\10RANDUl\1 OF UNDERSTANDING 
TfllS AGREEMENT, entered into between the City of Sandpoint, 1123 Lake Street, 
Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho a municipal corporation of the State ofidaho herein referred to 
as "CITY" and the Independent Highway District, a Governmental Subdivision of the State of 
Idaho, P.O. Box 1047, Sandpoint, Idaho, herein referred to as "IlID", 
WHEREAS, the IlID has title to the streets and rights-of-way within the city but by 
mutual agreement the CITY has control of all streets and rights-of-way within the CITY; and 
V\.1HEREAS, the boundaries of the CITY remain within the boundaries of the IHD; and 
WHEREAS, it is necessary, from time to time, to vacate streets and rights-of-way within 
·the CITY. 
NOW THEREFORE, the CITY and the IlID hereby agree as follows: 
1. The CITY shall have the right and power to vacate streets and rights-of-way 
within CITY limits subject to the provisions of this Agreement and Idaho Code. 
2. The CITY shall notify IlID in writing prior to any public hearing regarding the 
vacating of a right-of-way within CITY limits. 
3. If no written objection to the request to vacate is received from IHD within thirty 
(30) days of said notice, the CITY may proceed with such vacation. The HID 
shall also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing title to the vacated 
way. 
4. 
5. 
lf written objection is received from IHD stating the reasons for the objection, the 
CITY shall deny the request to vacate. 
IEID shall defend any claim related to a IHD objection to vacation request. 
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6. The CITY shall, at its' sole expense, take all legal steps required by law to vacate 
streets and rights-of-way within CITY limits including provisions for all required 
notices and public hearings. 
DATED this __ day of ____ _____, 2005. 
()' 
,_ 
~~ ~./112.tlOS 
OND P. LER DA E 
YOR 
ATTEST: 
)T10~ µ 
MAREEPECK 
CITY CLERK 
INDEPENDENT IDGHW AY DISTRICT 
~Q~ 9-/,;-06 
~B l3LL,Cli'AN DATE -· 
~~ 0MMISSIONER DATE 
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